We consider propositional logic programs with negations. We de ne notions of constructive transformation and constructive completion of a program. We use these notions to characterize SLDNF-resolution in classical, intuitionistic and intermediate logics, and also to derive a characterization in modal logics of knowledge. We show that the three-valued and four-valued x-point or declarative semantics for program P are equivalent to the two-valued semantics for the constructive version of P . We argue that it would be bene cial to replace Negation as Failure by constructive transformation, and it would be bene cial to use the two-valued semantics for the constructive version of the program instead of multivalued semantics for the original program.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with declarative interpretations of logic programs using several logical systems. The systems which we will use were developed long before logic programming came into being. Among them, intuitionistic logic and modal logics are of special importance: it has been argued by philosophers and researchers in arti cial intelligence that common sense reasoning employs methods of such systems.
In this paper we will analyze negation as failure (abbreviated as NF). NF is the central notion in the area of negation in logic programming. It serves as a model on which the variant implemented in Prolog is based, and it is a point of reference with which other versions of negation are compared. For an overview of issues related to negation the reader is referred to a survey paper by Apt and Bol. 1 NF is based on the following idea of Clark: In order to answer whether A is provable, try proving A; if the proof succeeds, answer NO to the original question; if the proof fails, answer YES to the original question. 6 Unfortunately the simplicity and elegance of this idea gets obscured by technical details if one considers programs which contain variables. For this reason in this paper we will investigate only programs without variables i.e. propositional programs. We believe that a great deal can be learned about the nature of general NF from considering this simpler case. Also, this class of programs is not without importance for applications: in rule-based expert systems knowledge is often represented in propositional logic.
We will be looking for mathematical results which could assure that programming can be declarative. According to the idea of declarative programming, one could write logic programs thinking of them as of speci cations and not considering their procedural behavior under SLDNF-resolution:
answers computed by SLDNF-resolution should be exactly the logical consequences of an easily understandable completion of the program. This idea was rst formalized by Clark. 6 His results can be reformulated as follows:
SLDNF-resolution with de 2 In our approach we will de ne and investigate the notion of constructive transformation of a program. We will show that this notion can replace negation as failure, can be used to characterize the SLDNF-computations and can eliminate the need for multivalued semantics.
In this paper our intention is to present the material in a way which allows us to rethink basic properties of SLDNF-resolution and notice symmetries of this notion which have been overlooked or which do not receive su cient emphasis in other literature.
Here is the outline of the paper. Section 2 de nes the terminology and notation to be used in the paper and explores basic symmetries of SLDNF-resolution. Section 3 presents the constructive transformation P + of a program P and shows how it can eliminate the use of negation as failure. It also contains a characterization of SLDNF-resolution using interpretations of logic programs in classical, intuitionistic and intermediate logics. One of the subsections will recall the syntax and semantics of modal logics and give yet another characterization of SLDNF-resolution. Section 4 compares the two valued x-point and declarative semantics for P + with multivalued semantics for the original program P. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Basic Properties of Propositional SLDNF-resolution 2.1. Basic De nitions
We assume the terminology, de nitions and basic results from chapters 1-3 of Foundations of Logic Programming by J.W. Lloyd, but some additions will be needed. 19 We will generalize the notion of a program by admitting arbitrary formulas with >; ?;^; _; : in the bodies of statements. With this generalization every program can be transformed to Clark's form, i.e. to the form in which every propositional symbol occurs as the head of exactly one statement. Having programs in Clark's form will be essential for further considerations. We will extend SLDNF-resolution to handle such generalized programs and notice that all the basic de nitions and results of semantics extend to this setting. We will also de ne a number of straightforward but useful transformations of programs. Then, as the notion of a nite failure set is de ned in Lloyd's book only for de nite programs, according to our needs, we will extend this notion to programs containing negations in statement bodies.
Finally, we will be considering SLDNF-computations, i.e. sets of possible derivations. Recall that SLDNF is an idealized version of Prolog. At the propositional level there are only two di erences between Prolog and SLDNF-resolution. In Prolog atoms in a goal are selected in the left-to-right order while in SLDNF selection is nondeterministic, and Prolog selects rules in derivations in a systematic manner using backtracking, while SLDNF selects rules nondeterministically. We will de ne notation SLDNF(P; L)=YES; SLDNF(P; L)=NO and SLDNF(P; L)=", which intuitively correspond to situations when the idealized Prolog answers YES, NO, or loops in nitely. This notation will be later used in several non-procedural characterizations of SLDNF-computations. Now the details. We write >; ? to denote the truth constants: true and false. We write to denote reversed implication: A B is the same as B ! A. The formula B is identi ed with ? B, which is equivalent to :B. The empty conjunction is identi ed with >; the empty disjunction is identi ed with ?. De nition 2 Throughout this paper symbol Prop will represent a set of propositional symbols such that Prop \ f p j p 2 Propg = ;. 2 By a propositional atom we understand any propositional symbol; truth constants are not atoms. By a propositional literal we understand either a propositional symbol or a negation of a propositional symbol. By a propositional de nite clause we understand any formula A B where A is an atom and B is a conjunction of atoms and truth constants. By a propositional normal clause we understand any formula A B where A is an atom and B is a conjunction of literals and truth constants. The next de nition generalizes these notions.
De nition 3
By a propositional positive formula we understand any formula built from propositional atoms and truth constants by means of^; _. By a propositional positive statement we understand any formula A B where A is a propositional atom and B is a propositional positive formula. By a propositional positive program we understand any nite set of propositional positive statements. By a propositional positive goal we understand any formula B where B is a propositional positive formula.
By a propositional statement we understand any formula A B where A is a propositional atom and B is an arbitrary propositional formula built from propositional atoms and truth constants by means of^; _; :. By a propositional general program we understand any nite set of propositional statements. By a propositional general goal we understand any propositional formula B where B is arbitrary propositional formula built from propositional atoms and truth constants by means of^; _; :. 2 De nition 4 1 . A propositional general program P over Prop is said to be in Clark 
2 Notice that in order to apply Clark's transformation it is important to know the set of propositional symbols intended for the program. While applying Clark's transformation, for every propositional symbol which does not occur in the program, we need to add a clause p ?. The de nition of Clark's transformation is the only part of our considerations which requires the assumption that P is nite.
The standard de nition of SLDNF-resolution covers only normal programs and normal goals. We will extend it to general programs and goals through a series of transformations.
De nition 5 19 In the next de nition we extend this notion to general programs.
De nition 6 Let P be a propositional general program over Prop. By the SLDNFnite failure set for P we understand the set of all propositional symbols p 2 Prop, such that there exists a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; p. 2 For a de nite programs, the standard notion of SLD-nite failure set coincides with the notion of SLDNF-nite failure set above. 19 One of the problems in the theory of logic programming is nding a nonprocedural characterization of existence/non-existence of the successful or failed SLDNF-derivations. The next de nition introduces notation convenient for discussing this problem.
De nition 7 Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal.
SLDNF(P; B) = YES is read:
\SLDNF-computation for P; B returns answer YES" and means: there exists an SLDNF-refutation for P; B. 2. SLDNF(P; B) = NO is read:
\SLDNF-computation for P; B returns answer NO" and means: there exists a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; B. 3. SLDNF(P; B) =" is read:
\SLDNF-computation for P; B loops in nitely" and means: there exists neither an SLDNF-refutation nor a nitely failed tree for P; B. For propositional positive programs and goals under SLD-resolution, the notation SLD(P; B)=YES, SLD(P; B)=NO, SLD(P; B)=" is de ned analogously.
2 Basic properties of transformations of programs are stated without proof in the following proposition. Proposition 8 Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal. Then:
1. Every two of the following are equivalent in classical logic: B, B deM , B dnf . 2. Every two of the following are equivalent in classical logic: P, P C , P deM , P dnf , P S . 3. Every two of the following are equivalent in classical logic: Comp(P), Comp(P C ), Comp(P deM ), Comp(P dnf ), Comp(P S ). 4 . Each of the following returns the same result: SLDNF(P; B), SLDNF(P C ; B), SLDNF(P deM ; B deM ), SLDNF(P dnf ; B dnf ), SLDNF(P S ; B dnf ). Because of this proposition, when we work in classical logic, we will be allowed to use freely any of the transformations de ned above.
Basic Properties of Propositional SLDNF-resolution
First let us state the relation of the notion of SLDNF-computation and success and nite failure sets. The following proposition results immediately from the de nitions of the SLDNF-success set and SLDNF-nite failure set.
Proposition 9 Let P be a propositional general program and let p be a propositional symbol. Then:
1. p belongs to the SLDNF-success set of P i SLDNF(P; p) = YES, 2. p belongs to the SLDNF-nite failure set of P i SLDNF(P; p) = NO. The next two Propositions show internal symmetries of the notion of SLDNFcomputation.
Proposition 10 Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal. Then exactly one of the following conditions holds: SLDNF(P; B) = YES, SLDNF(P; B) = NO, SLDNF(P; B) =". Notice that an analogous property holds for SLD-resolution and propositional positive programs.
Proof. It is clear that at least one of these conditions holds. Indeed, by definition SLDNF(P; B) =" if neither SLDNF(P; B) = YES nor SLDNF(P; B) = NO. For the same reason we can see that conditions SLDNF(P; B) = YES and SLDNF(P; B) =" are disjoint, as well as SLDNF(P; B) = NO and SLDNF(P; B) =" are disjoint. It remains to show that SLDNF(P; B) = YES and SLDNF(P; B) = NO are disjoint. Restricting Theorem 9.2 (p. 51) in Lloyd's book to the propositional case and allowing general programs, we obtain: If there is a successful derivation for P; B, then for every computation rule R there is a successful derivation for P; B via R. 19 So, if there is a successful derivation for P; B, then every SLDNF-tree for P; B contains a successful branch, i.e. there are no nite failure trees. 2
Proposition 11 Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal. Then: 
SLDNF(P; B) = YES, i
there is i 2 I such that SLDNF(P; B i ) = YES, i there is i 2 I such that for every conjunct L in B i , SLDNF(P; L) = YES, i there is i 2 I such that for every conjunct L in B i , SLDNF(P; :L) = NO, i for every j 2 J there is a literal :L in B j such that SLDNF(P; :L) = NO, i for every j 2 J, SLDNF(P; B j ) = NO, i SLDNF(P; :B) = NO.
The second equivalence in the proposition is a reformulation of the rst one. The third equivalence follows from the rst and the second by Proposition 10. 2 SLDNF-resolution for propositional general programs and goals can be characterized by means of a game in the style of Ehrenfeucht.
Remark 12 Given a propositional general program P and goal B we de ne game GAME(P; B). Two players participate in this game. Each player assumes either a role of a proponent or a role of an opponent; their roles may change during the game. At every point of the game they consider a formula and replace it by another formula. Who moves next depends on the current formula. The game starts with a Player 1 being a proponent, Player 2 being an opponent, and initial formula being B. If the current formula is a disjunction B 1 _ : : : _ B n , the proponent replaces it by one of the disjuncts B i . If the current formula is a conjunction B 1^: : :^B n , the opponent replaces it by one of the conjuncts B i . If the current formula is a negation :B, it is replaced by B and the players change roles: the proponent becomes an opponent and the opponent becomes a proponent. If the current formula is a propositional symbol p, the proponent chooses a statement p B 0 from P and replaces the current formula by B 0 ; if there is no such a statement, the current formula is replaced by ?. If the current formula is > the game ends, the proponent being a winner. If the current formula is ? the game ends, the opponent being a winner.
One can prove that: SLDNF(P; B) = YES i Player 1 has a winning strategy in GAME(P; B), SLDNF(P; B) = NO i Player 2 has a winning strategy in GAME(P; B), SLDNF(P; B) =" i neither player has a winning strategy in GAME(P; B). \I learned to recognize the thorough and primitive duality of man; I saw that, of the two natures that contended in the eld of my consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was only because I was radically both; and from an early date, even before the course of my scienti c discoveries had begun to suggest the most naked possibility of such a miracle, I had learned to dwell with pleasure, as a beloved day-dream, on the thought of the separation of these elements. If each, I told myself, could but be housed in separate identities, life would be relieved of all that was unbearable ...] It was the curse of mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound together { that in the agonized womb of consciousness, these polar twins should be continuously struggling. How, then, were they dissociated?" Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 1886.
We will de ne the constructive completion Comp(P + ) for a propositional general program P, and prove soundness and completeness of propositional SLDNFresolution. Comp(P + ) is di erent from Clark's completion Comp(P) { it uses an extended language in which every propositional symbol p has a counterpart p. Informally speaking, p represents the negation of p in a positive way. This idea originates from the Prolog programming method of constructive negation: instead of using a negative literal :A, de The proof will be given in the next section. This theorem suggests the following important strategy for handling programs with negation: instead of performing SLDNF resolution on P; B, construct the positive program and goal P + ; B + and perform SLD-resolution. This idea can be carried over to the case of rst-order programs with >; ?;^; _; :;8; 9 and a resolution system which extends SLDNF and is capable of handling such programs. 22;24 The following theorem shows that the constructive completion fully characterizes the behavior of propositional SLDNF-resolution. Remark 24 Intensional negation was de ned in P. Mancarella's doctoral dissertation and subsequent papers. 3;4 The notion initially was applied to de nite programs, to which possibly negative queries could be asked. In a paper in the 1990 North American Logic Programming Conference Mancarella, Pedreschi, Rondinelli and Tagliatti, de ned an algebra of logic programs. 20 The elements of this algebra are normal programs over a xed alphabet, with certain restrictions on occurrences of variables. The algebra is equipped with operations ; \; Not, which are based on semantical ideas, with Not being an extension of the intensional negation. (We suppose that this algebra is a Boolean algebra and believe it is worth further investigation.) Using the operations of the algebra, the authors de ne a transformation of a program P into a new program denoted P ? P + . For the purpose of discussion we will change their notation to P P . One can prove that for a propositional normal program P, the following relationship holds between P P and our P + : P + = P P . In the light of this equality, Propositions 4 and 6 stated without proofs in the paper of Mancarella et al. are equivalent to our Theorem 19 and Lemma 28. 2
Remark 25 Drabent and Martelli de ned the following operation. 8 Given a normal program P, add to P its copy P 0 in which every predicate symbol p is replaced by a new symbol p 0 ; then replace every :p in P by :p 0 and every :p 0 in P 0 by :p. The obtained program is denoted split(P). In Theorem 6 the authors proved that for an allowed program and goal P; B the following equivalence holds.
Comp(split(P)) j = split(B) i SLDNF(P; B) computes
( ) The proof relies on a reduction of this equivalence to Kunen's completeness result in three-valued logic. Let us observe that for a propositional normal program P over Prop the following relation holds between split(P) and P + : f:p 0 p j p 2 Propg j = split(P) P + In the light of this equivalence, ( ) is a generalization of our Theorem 20. Later in our paper we will consider characterizations of SLDNF-resolution in intuitionistic and intermediate logics; it would be interesting to investigate whether for allowed programs the equivalence ( ) generalizes to such a setting.
2 Let us also mention that doubled program and partial completion are yet another reincarnation of constructive completion. 28;29 As the research for which these notions were used goes in a di erent direction than ours, we will not discuss them in detail.
Proofs
In this section we will prove results related to soundness and completeness which were stated in Subsection 3.1.
The idea of the proof is the following: First we prove the following equivalences:
SLDNF(P; B) = NO i SLD(P + ; B + ) = NO. Implications to the right in (i) and (ii) are proved in parallel by induction on the length of a successful SLDNF-derivation or on depth of SLDNF-nite failure tree. Implications to the left in (i) and (ii) require transforming SLD-derivations to a certain normal form and using inductions similar to the previous ones. Then by soundness and completeness of SLD-resolution for de nite programs we obtain points 1 and 2 of Theorem 20. Point 3 follows from points 1 and 2 by Proposition 10.
Inductions used in the proofs in this section are straightforward but a little strenuous. The reader may wish to skip to the next subsection and come back here after having read the rest of the paper.
In the proofs we will use the following conventions.
If L is a negative literal :A, then :L is identi ed with A.
If L is q, L is identi ed with q.
If L is :q, then hLi is q; if L is q, then hLi is q. Lemma 26 Let P be a propositional general program, and let p be a propositional symbol. Then:
Proof. We prove both statements in parallel by induction on the length of successful SLD-derivation for P + ; p or P + ; p. SLD(P + ; p) = YES derived in 1 step.
Then the (unique) statement de ning p in P + is of the form p > _ B, where B is a disjunction of conjunctions of atoms. Thus the (unique) state-ment de ning p in P + is of the form p W i2I (?^B i ), where each B i is a conjunction of atoms. This is interpreted as a collection p ?^B i : i 2 I of statements in a de nite program. If we start from p, and use each of these rules, and select atom ? in every derived goal, we obtain a nite failure tree for P + ; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = NO. SLD(P + ; p) = YES derived in 1 step.
Similar to the case above. SLD(P + ; p) = YES derived in n + 1 steps.
Let p L 1^: : :^L k be the clause in (the normal version of) P + , with which the successful derivation for P + ; p starts. By induction hypothesis, for each L i : i k there is a nitely failed SLD-tree for P; L. (If L is q, by L we understand just q). The (unique) statement de ning p in P + is of the form p (L 1^: : :^L k )_B where B is a disjunction of conjunctions of atoms. Thus every clause de ning p in the normal version of P + contains one of L i : i k as a conjunct in its body: p : : :^L i^: : :. If we start from p and use each of these clauses, selecting in each of derived goals the corresponding atom L i and constructing further nite failure trees for these atoms, we will obtain a nitely failed SLD-tree for P; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = NO. SLD(P + ; p) = YES derived in n + 1 steps.
Similar to the case above. Proof. We prove both statements in parallel by induction on the depth of nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; p or P + ; p. Finitely failed SLD-tree of depth 1 for P; p.
Then the (unique) statement de ning p in P + is of the form p W i (?B i ), where each B i is a conjunction of of atoms. Thus the unique statement de ning p in P + is of the form p > _ B 0 , where each B 0 is a disjunction of conjunctions of atoms. Using the clause p > from the de nite version of P + , we obtain a successful derivation for P; p. Finitely failed SLD-tree of depth 1 for P; p.
Similar to the case above. Finitely failed SLD-tree of depth n + 1 for P; p.
Let p : : :^L 1^: : :; : : :; p : : :^L k^: : : be the collection of all clauses in the de nite version of P + , with L 1 ; : : :; L k being the literals selected in the construction of nitely failed SLD-tree of depth n+1 for P; p. By induction hypothesis, for each i k there is a successful derivation for P; L i . In the de nite version of P + there has to be a clause p L 1^: : :^L k . Using this clause, and then performing steps from successful derivations for P; L i for each i, we obtain a successful derivation for P + ; p. So SLD(P; p) = YES. Finitely failed SLD-tree of depth n + 1 for P; p.
Similar to the case above. 2
Lemma 28 Let P be a propositional general program, and let p be a propositional symbol. Then: Proof of Theorem 18. Lemma 29 Let P be a propositional general program, and let p be a propositional symbol. Then:
1. SLDNF(P; p) = YES implies SLD(P + ; p) = YES, 2. SLDNF(P; p) = NO implies SLD(P + ; p) = NO.
Proof. We prove both statements in parallel by induction on the rank of the successful SLDNF-derivation for P; p, or on the rank of nitely failed tree for P; p. Successful SLDNF-derivation of rank 0 for P; p. The derivation is of rank 0, which means that no negative subgoals were selected. By replacing every negative literal :q in the derivation by q we obtain a successful SLD-derivation for P + ; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = YES.
Finitely failed SLDNF-tree of rank 0 for P; p. The tree is of rank 0, which means that no negative subgoals were selected.
Replacing every negative literal :q in the tree by q we obtain a nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = NO. Successful SLDNF-derivation of rank n + 1 for P; p.
Consider each negative subgoal :A selected in this derivation. P; A has a nitely failed SLDNF-tree of rank n, and by induction hypothesis, there exists a nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; A, then by Lemma 27, there exists a successful SLD-derivation for P + ; A. If we replace each selected negative subgoal :A in the successful SLDNF-derivation for P; p by the corresponding successful SLD-derivation for P + ; A, and also each remaining negative literal :q by q, we will obtain a successful SLD-derivation for P + ; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = YES. Finitely failed SLDNF-tree of rank n + 1 for P; p.
Consider each :A selected in each goal which is not the last goal on a branch of the tree. P; :A has a successful SLDNF-derivation of rank n, so by Proposition 11, P; A has a nitely failed SLDNF-tree (and the tree constructed in the proof of that proposition is of rank n. By induction hypothesis there is a nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; A and then by Lemma 28 there is a successful SLD-derivation for P + ; A. Replace each such goal by the corresponding successful SLD-derivation for P + ; A.
Consider each :A selected in a goal which is the last goal on a branch of the tree. P; A has a successful SLDNF-derivation of rank n, and by induction hypothesis there is a successful SLD-derivation for P + ; A, then by Lemma 26 there exists a nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; A. Replace each such goal in the nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; A by the corresponding nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; A, then replace each remaining negative literal :q in the tree by q. We will obtain a nitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; p. So SLD(P + ; p) = NO. 2
The last proof shows that every SLDNF-derivation for general program P translates directly into an SLD-derivation for program P + . The converse translation is more complex because not all SLD-derivations for P + correspond directly to SLDNF-derivations for P. Recall that in SLDNF-derivations negative subgoals are treated as \lemmas" which must be completed before other literals can be selected and resolved. On the other hand in an SLD-derivation for P + , given a goal, say, q 1^q2 , we could select atom q 2 , replace it by, say q 3 obtaining q 1^q3 and then instead of selecting q 3 (to complete the \lemma"), we could select q 1 , etc. As the \lemma" starting from q 2 has not been completed, such a derivation does not translate directly into an SLDNF-derivation. To deal with this problem we de ne systematic derivations for P + , as those in which \lemmas" are treated appropriately; we prove that it is enough to use such derivations, and that they translate directly into SLDNF-derivations. Remark 31
1. Every SLD-derivation via the computation rule \select rst from the left" is systematic. (This is the rule that is used in Prolog). 2. It is known that: If P; p has a successful SLD-derivation, then it has a successful SLD-derivation via the rule \select rst from the left". Cf. Thm. 9.2, p. 51 in Lloyd's book. 19 The same is not true for nitely failed trees. Consider program P: p q^r r ?
Then P; p has a nitely failed SLD-tree, but the tree constructed using the rule \select rst from the left" is not nite. 3. According to the standard de nition, a computation rule in a derivation, is a function from a set of de nite goals to a set of atoms, such that the value of the function for a goal in the derivation is the atom that gets selected. 19 With this de nition, not every derivation is a derivation via a computation rule. Indeed, consider the following program P: Let us remark that the lemma above holds not only for programs of the form P + but for arbitrary de nite programs. Proving this requires however using another construction in point 2.
Lemma 35 Let P be a propositional general program and let p be a propositional symbol. Then:
1. There exists a successful systematic SLD-derivation of rank n for P + ; p i there exists a systematic nitely failed SLD-tree of rank n for P + ; p. 2. There exists a successful systematic SLD-derivation of rank n for P + ; p i there exists a systematic nitely failed SLD-tree of rank n for P + ; p.
Proof. Repeat the constructions from Lemmas 26, 27 and check that the resulting derivation or tree, is systematic and of the required rank. 2
Lemma 36 Let P be a propositional general program and let p be a propositional symbol. Then:
1. SLD(P + ; p) = YES implies SLDNF(P; p) = YES, 2. SLD(P + ; p) = NO implies SLDNF(P; p) = NO.
Proof. By Lemma 34, it is enough to prove the following two statements:
1. If there is a successful systematic SLD-derivation of rank n for P + ; p, then there is a successful SLDNF-derivation for P; p. 2. If there is a systematic nitely failed SLD-tree of rank n for P + ; p, then there is a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; p. We prove both statements in parallel, by induction on n. Successful SLD-derivation for P + ; p of rank 0.
No \negative" subgoals (like q) were selected in this derivation. Therefore if we replace every q by :q, we will obtain a successful SLDNF-derivation for P; p.
Finitely failed SLD-tree for P + ; p of rank 0.
No \negative" subgoals (like q) were selected in the derivations of the tree.
Therefore if we replace every q by :q, we will obtain a nitely failed SLDNFtree for P; p. Successful systematic SLD-derivation for P + ; p of rank n + 1.
Consider any maximal lemma in this derivation which is negative. Rank of the lemma is n. If the lemma starts with : : :^q^: : :, where q is the selected atom, by Lemma 35 there is a systematic nitely failed SLD-tree for P; q of rank n, and by induction hypothesis there is a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; q. Therefore by cutting out all negative maximal lemmas from the SLD-derivation for P + ; p, and by replacing all the remaining \negative" atoms q by :q, we obtain a successful SLDNF-derivation for P; p.
Finitely failed systematic SLD-tree for P + ; p of rank n + 1. In this case we rst have to deal with lemmas and than with failed lemmas. Consider a node in the tree, at which a branch with a negative maximallemma starts: : : :^q^: : : with the selected atom q. The lemma is of rank n, so by Lemma 35, there is a nitely failed systematic SLD-tree for P + ; q of rank n, and by induction hypothesis there is a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; q. Delete all the branches coming out of : : :^q^: : : except the one containing the lemma; in this branch cut out the lemma. Do that for all negative maximal lemmas. Now consider a node where a negative maximal failed lemma starts: : : :^q 0^: : :. Notice that as we scooped all lemmas in the previous step, every branch coming out of our node is now a failed lemma. The tree from this node down, is of rank n. By Lemma 35 there exists a successful systematic SLD-derivation for P; q 0 of rank n, and by induction hypothesis there exists a successful SLDNF-derivation for P; q 0 . By Proposition 11 there exists a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; :q ; replace the tree starting at : : :^q 0^: : : by this tree.
Finally replace all the negative atoms q in the tree by :q. Resulting tree is a nitely failed SLDNF-tree for P; p. Our next task will be to generalize Theorem 20 on soundness and completeness, allowing deductions in, so called, intermediate logics. These are logics which fall between intuitionistic and classical logic (including the two).
Let us mention that in other research, Miller and Gabbay showed that intuitionistic logic rather than classical logic provides the correct semantics for logic programs. 14;21 The propositional intuitionistic logic will be denoted IL. Every intuitionistic tautology is a classical tautology, but not vice versa; for instance p _ :p is not an intuitionistic tautology. Intuitionistic logic is considered to be a logic of constructive reasoning. Constructivists argue that in order to prove B 1 _B 2 one needs to prove at least one of B 1 ; B 2 ; in consequence there are propositions p for which p_:p cannot be proved constructively. Much of common sense reasoning has a constructive avor, and when formalized can be placed between intuitionistic and classical logic.
While considering declarative semantics of programs in intuitionistic logic we are allowed to replace P by P C and vice versa. This is because the following formula is an intuitionistic tautology: The following proposition is of crucial importance for this section.
Proposition 37 Let P be a propositional positive program and let B be a propositional positive formula. Let L be any intermediate logic (including intuitionistic logic and classical logic). Then:
where`is the consequence operation of classical logic.
Proof. The implications to the right are obvious. It is enough to prove implications to the left for L being intuitionistic logic. The proof of the point 2 is analogous and uses implication (iii). 2 Because of problems with disjunctive normal form which were mentioned earlier, we need to carefully consider whether we are allowed to turn programs and queries into such a form while working in intuitionistic logic. As the reader already expects, in general, P and P dnf are not intuitionistically equivalent, even for positive programs. However if we are concerned with positive intuitionistic consequences of P and P dnf it turns out that there is no di erence between them! This is made precise in the following corollary which results from Proposition 37 and the fact that P, P dnf (and other transformations of P) are equivalent in classical logic.
Corollary 38 Let P be a propositional positive program and let B be a propositional positive formula. Let L be any intermediate logic (including intuitionistic logic and classical logic). Then:
1. Every two of the following are equivalent: P`L B, P C`L B, P deM`L B deM , P dnf`L B dnf , P S`L B dnf , 2. Every two of the following are equivalent:
The following corollary results from Proposition 37 and the fact that in classical logic, for positive programs and goals, Comp(P)`B i P`B.
Corollary 39 Let P be a propositional positive program and let B be a propositional positive formula. Let L be any intermediate logic (including intuitionistic logic and
As in programming practice, reasoning about SLDNF-derivations for bigger programs is not expected to be formal, it is important to know that the entire machinery of classical logic is not necessary in the proofs. So the following result assures us that there is a good chance to deduce all the needed properties of propositional SLDNF-derivations while reasoning in an informal way. Notice that by Corollary 39 we could use P + instead of Comp(P + ) in this theorem.
Proof. Immediately from Theorem 20 and Proposition 37. 
Modal Completion and Characterization of Propositional SLDNF-resolution in Modal Logics
In this section we will de ne a notion of modal completion of a general program. We will obtain a soundness and completeness for propositional SLDNF-resolution with respect to a wide family of modal logics. Among them there will be some well known logics of knowledge including a version of the system S4.
Let us mention that in another research, Gabbay proved completeness of propositional SLDNF-resolution using a notion of a x-point completion in the propositional modal logic of arithmetical provability. 13 A similar characterization for strat-i ed rst-order programs was obtained by Balbiani. 2 . The modal logic of arithmetical provability is rather complex and not widely known, our approach will be more straightforward.
The intuitions behind the construction of modal completion are the following. Consider an agent who performs SLDNF-resolution with a xed program P and various goals. While considering a positive goal the agent uses breadth-rst search in the tree of SLDNF-derivations, so if a successful SLDNF-derivation exists, sooner or later he will nd it. While considering a negative goal, the agent builds in parallel all possible failure trees, so if a nite failure tree exists, sooner or later he will nd it. The agent is a perfect executor of SLDNF-resolution: whenever the goal is SLDNF-derivable, the agent will derive it.
We will characterize the SLDNF-derivability, as performed by the agent, in modal logic. 2p will mean the agent can prove p.
Let stand for negation as failure. To prove p the agent constructs a nite failure tree for p. Every branch of this tree can be viewed as a failed attempt to construct a successful derivation for p. The branches of the tree exhaust all possibilities: if all branches are failed, the agent can be sure that there is no successful derivation for p (even if a di erent order of selecting literals were used). So, by constructing a nite failure tree for p the agent proves that using his limited proof methods he will never be able to prove p. Thus p will be interpreted as 2:2p.
Our characterization will of course depend on the program P considered by the agent. If there is a fact p (i.e. statement p >) in the program, our axioms, denoted P 2 , will imply 2p. If there is a statement p 1 p 2 _ (:p 3^p4 ) in P C , the axioms P 2 will imply 2p 1 2p 2 _ (2:2p 3^2 p 4 ) as well as 2:2p 1 2:2p 2^( 2p 3 _ 2:2p 4 ). These formulas accurately describe what the agent can prove. We can expect the following equivalences SLDNF(P; p) = YES i P 2`L 2p, SLDNF(P; p) = NO i P 2`L 2:2p. We will also consider a set of axioms C(P 2 ) obtained from P 2 by replacing reversed implications by equivalences . Unlike P 2 the axioms C(P 2 ) imply not only what the agent can prove but also what he cannot prove. The set C(P 2 ) is expected to give an analogous characterization of SLDNF-resolution.
It would be interesting to see what modal logics L can be used in such characterizations. A choice of a modal logic L will a ect how much reasoning power the agent has besides being able to perform SLDNF-resolution. For instance, L may contain the axiom schema 2B ! 22B which is known in the domain of logics of knowledge as the axiom of positive introspection. However, we will see that L cannot contain the the axiom of negative introspection: :2B ! 2:2B.
And now, a formal treatment of this idea.
De nition 41 (Modal transformation and completion)
The modal transformation ( ) 2 of propositional formulas and general programs is de ned as follows. For a formula B over Prop containing no connectives other than >; ?;^; _; :, the formula B 2 is obtained from B + by replacing every propositional symbol p by 2p and every symbol p by 2:2p. For a general program P, its modal transformation P 2 is obtained from P + by replacing every propositional symbol p by 2p and every symbol p by 2:2p.
The of formulas satisfying the following conditions. The sequence consists of a global part followed by a local part; either part can be empty. The sequence ends with B. In the global part every formula is either an instance of a logical axiom schema or results from formulas occurring earlier in the sequence by means of rules MP or RN. In the local part every formula is either a member of ?, or results from formulas occurring earlier in the sequence (possibly in the global part) by means of the rule MP.
Notice that in this logic the use of RN is restricted, causing that for instance, Notice that SLDNF(P; p) =". As Comp(P)`p this program constitutes another example showing that SLDNF-resolution is not complete with respect to Clark's completion of P. Let us now see how Theorem 43 works for this program. According to the theorem in order to show that SLDNF(P; p) =" it is enough to show that in dS4 C(P 2 ) 6 2p and C(P 2 ) 6 2:2p. For that, we present a Kripke model for dS4. Let 2 Now let us state a result which implies that in the equivalences of Theorem 43 we could use just P 2 instead of C(P 2 ).
Theorem 45 Let L be any modal logic extending MIL and contained in dS4. Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal. Then:
Remark 46 The reasoning which is used in the proof does not exclude the possibility that a logic L which is not contained in dS4 could be used in of Theorem 43. Let us notice however that if such a logic L contains CL and MP it cannot contain the schema 5: :2B ! 2:2B. If schema 5 belonged to the logic the equivalences of Theorem 43 would not hold. This can be shown using program P containing statements p p and q p _ :p. We have SLDNF(P; q) =" On the other hand P 2 contains formula 2q 2p _ 2:2p, from which, using CL, MP and schema 5 one can derive 2q.
The property expressed by schema 5 is called negative introspection. Let us think again about the informal interpretation of 2 discussed at the beginning of this section. Allowing the axiom of negative introspection in L would mean that if there is no successful derivation for p the agent somehow deduces p even if there is no nite failure tree. This is clearly contrary to the spirit of SLDNF. 2 Remark 47 Let us use the symbol sS4 to denote the version of logic S4 which is a standard system in the sense of Rasiowa. In sS4 items CL, K, T, 4 are used as logical axiom schemas and the uses of rules MP and RN are unrestricted. This means, ?`s S4 B if there exists a sequence of formulas ending with B in which every formula is either an instance of a logical axiom schema, or a member of ?, or results from formulas occurring earlier in the sequence by means of rules MP or RN.
Unlike for dS4, we have p`s S4 2p. The logic sS4 is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke interpretations based on re exive and transitive frames in which validity is de ned as:
M j = B if w j`B for every world w of M. Notice that logic sS4 cannot be used in the equivalences of Theorem 43. This can be shown by considering program P containing one statement: p :p. We have SLDNF(P; p) =". On the other hand, P 2 implies the formula 2p 2:2p which does not have any sS4 model. So P 2 j = sS4 2p.
The fact that dS4 but not sS4 can be used in Theorem 43 adds the following to our informal understanding of the modal interpretation. What the agent can or cannot prove is accurately described by C(P 2 ), however the agent cannot know (i.e. prove) that his knowledge is described by C(P 2 ). To prove Theorems 43 and 45 it is enough to show the following implications: (i) SLDNF(P; B) = YES implies P +`B+ (ii)
Comp(P + )`B + implies SLDNF(P; B) = YES These implications su ce for the proof of Theorem 45 and point 1 of Theorem 43. Point 2 of Theorem 43 can be proved analogously; point 3 results from points 1,2.
Implications (i) and (v) result from Theorem 20. Implication (ii) is rst proved for B being a propositional symbol p by induction on n such that p 2 T P " n. Then the statement is generalized to arbitrary formula B. This is the part of the proof where it is important that MIL L. Implication (iii) is obvious. For the proof of implication (iv) we assume Comp(P + ) 6 B + and construct a Kripke model for dS4 which is a model for C(P 2 ) but not for B 2 . This is the part of the proof where it is important that L dS4. Now, the details.
De nition 48 Let P be a set of de nite clauses. If (q >) 2 P then the sequence consisting of this single clause is called a pure detachment proof of rank 0 of q from P.
If (q p 1^: : :^p m ) 2 P and P 1 ; : : :; P m are pure detachment proofs of ranks n of, respectively, p 1 ; : : :; p m from P, then the concatenation of sequences P 1 ; : : :; P m and a one-element sequence hq p 1^: : :^p m i is called a pure detachment proof of rank n + 1 of q from P. 2 Notice that by inserting some tautologies, any pure detachment proof can be turned into a formal proof in the propositional classical logic.
Lemma 49 Let P be a positive program, and let p be a propositional symbol. If P`p then p has a pure detachment proof from P.
Proof. If P`p, then T P "!`p. Thus for a certain n < !, we have T P "n`p. By induction on n one can show that for any propositional symbol q, T P " n`q i q has a pure detachment proof of rank n from P. 2 Lemma 50 Let L be a propositional modal logic extending MIL. Let P; B be a propositional general program and goal. Then: Proof. We will prove that Comp(P + ) 6 B + implies C(P 2 ) 6 dS4 B 2 . Assume Comp(P + ) 6 B + . Let v 0 be the least x-point of T P + . Consider a Kripke interpretation M = hW; w 0 ; R; vi for dS4. We set W = fw 0 ; w 1 g, R to be a relation containing pairs hw 0 ; w 0 i; hw 0 ; w 1 i; hw 1 
Constructive Transformation versus Multi-valued Semantics
Fitting proposed using interpretations based on Kleene's strong three-valued logic as a semantics of logic programs. 10 Then he considered semantics based on the four-valued logic of Belnap and also on some more general structures. 11;5 Stark considered three-valued semantics and made a connection between the three-valued semantics, a variant of the four-valued semantics, and the two-valued semantics. 27;28 We will give relevant de nitions and show other connections, making a complete comparison of these semantics.
All the results of this section can be generalized to the rst-order case.
Two-valued (Classical) Semantics
Although the classical propositional logic and two-valued semantics of logic programs are well known, we will need to specify some of the de nitions in order to x the terminology and make notational conventions precise.
The formulas of classical propositional logic are built in the usual way from propositional symbols, connectives: >; ?;^; _;:; ; , and parentheses. these properties will be referred to as the monotonicity of B. The family of all two-valued interpretations of a xed propositional language with the ordering forms a complete lattice. With any positive propositional program P we associate an operator on this lattice:
T P (v) = fp j there exists B s:t: (p B) 2 P and v j = 2 Bg (Notice that transforming P does not change the outcome of the operator: T P (v) = T P C (v) = T P deM (v) = T P dnf (v) = T P S (v).) For a program P in Clark's form, for any propositional symbol p we have:
where B is the body of the unique statement de ning p in P. It is known that T P (v) = v i v j = 2 Comp(P).
Four-valued Semantics
We will consider a four-valued logic with the semantics involving the following truth values: T = h1; 0i (true), F = h0; 1i (false), U = h0; 0i (unde ned), C = h1; 1i (contradictory).
Intuitively, these truth values summarize possible opinions of independent experts: if all the experts agree that p is true, we assign T to p; if all the experts agree that p is false, we assign F to p; if the experts did not give any opinion about p, we assign U to p; if some experts claim that p is true while others claim that it is false, we assign C to p. This intuition underlies de nitions of operations >; ?;^; _; : which will be introduced.
As indicated above, the truth values T; F; U; C are identi ed with ordered pairs of Boolean values. Intuitively, the rst component of the pair is the degree of truth: 1 if we have any evidence of truth, 0 otherwise; the second component is the degree of falsity: 1 if we have any evidence of falsity, 0 otherwise.
We de ne a function + : fT; F; U; Cg ! f0; 1g as hz; z 0 i + = z. We de ne a function ? : fT; F; U; Cg ! f0; 1g as hz; z 0 i + = z 0 .
This means that the rst component of the pair representing truth value x is x + , and the second one is x ? .
The truth ordering t and knowledge ordering k are de ned as follows: The operations can be also characterized by the following tables. Table 1 . Semantics of the connectives of the four-valued logic.
T F U C _ T F U C :
The operation is not commutative; in the table specifying the values of x y, the values of x are listed in the border column and the values of y are listed in the border row. Notice that restricted to the set fT; Fg does not coincide with the classical reversed implication, it coincides with the classical equivalence. This operation is di erent from the implication used by most of other authors. 1 Many other operations could be de ned, but these are the only ones we will need in our considerations.
Notice that: x^y = glb t fx; yg, x _ y = lub t fx; yg, if y k x then x y = T, otherwise x y = F, if x = y then x y = T, otherwise x y = F. The formulas of the four valued logic are built in the usual way from propositional symbols, connectives: >; ?;^; _; :; ; and parentheses. We will use the same symbols for connectives and corresponding operations on fT; F; U; Cg. (Notice that transforming P does not change the outcome of the operator: P (v) = P C (v) = P deM (v) = P dnf (v) = P S (v).) For a general program P in Clark's form, for any propositional symbol p we have:
( P (I))(p) = I(B) where B is the body of the unique statement de ning p in P. It can be shown that: P (I) = I i I j = Comp(P), P (I) k I i I j = P.
The credit for various de nitions presented in this subsection goes to other authors. The idea of truth values which summarize opinions of independent experts and the de nitions of operations^; _ are due to Belnap, however his notion of negation is di erent from :, and he did not consider ; . 5 The de nitions of and P are obvious extensions of those introduced by Fitting in the context of threevalued logic. 10 The operation : in the context of four-valued logic was explicitly de ned by Fitting. 11 The operation is an obvious extension of that introduced by St ark in the context of three-valued logic. 27 Our semantical consequence relation I j = 4 B is di erent from that of St ark who de ned his by the condition I(B) + = 1 (which is equivalent to: I(B) = T or I(B) = C). 28 
Three-valued Semantics
The four-valued setting sketched above can be viewed as auxiliary. The area of \multi-valued semantics" for logic programming is predominantly concerned with the setting obtained by restricting the truth values to fT; F; Ug. Here are the details.
Notice that the set fT; F; Ug is closed under the operations >; ?;^; _; :; ; de ned above. We will consider a three-valued logic in which the truth values are:
T; F; U, and the relations t ; k and operations >; ?;^; _;:; ; are restrictions of those from the semantics of the four valued logic.
So restricted operations >; ?;^; _; : are identical to those in Kleene's strong three-valued logic, and only the operations ; are di erent. Let us mention that Kleene's intention was to construct a logic whose semantics besides classical truth values (now denoted by T and F), contains an additional value U, which means that the classical truth value is not yet known. U should be thought of as a value which may turn into T or F when our knowledge about the world increases. This understanding of U implies that e.g. U^T = U and U _ T = T. We set U^T = U because, in classical logic, the (classical) truth value of p^T cannot be determined if the (classical) truth value of p is not known. We set U _ T = T because, in classical logic, the truth value of p _ T is T independently of the (classical) truth value of p. All the cases in the de nitions of >; ?;^;_;: in the logic we consider can be justi ed in this way.
By a three-valued interpretation we understand any four-valued interpretation I which never assumes the truth value C; i.e. an interpretation I = hI + ; I ? i such that I + \ I ? = ;. If I is a three-valued interpretation, I j = 3 B means the same as I j = 4 B, the subscript 3 is used just to emphasize that I is three-valued; we will often write just I j = B. Given a set of propositional formulas ? fBg, we write ? j = 3 B to represent that every three-valued model for ? is a model for B.
The family of all three-valued interpretations of a xed propositional language with the knowledge ordering k is a partial order in which every non-empty subfamily has greatest lower bound, and every directed subfamily (including the empty subfamily) has least upper bound. The operator P de ned in the four-valued semantics, given a three-valued interpretation as an argument returns an interpretation which is also three-valued. For a general program P, the least x-point lfp P and the greatest x-point gfp P always exist; lfp P is always a three-valued interpretation, however gfp P can be four-valued interpretation which is not a three-valued interpretation.
The three-valued semantics of logic programs was introduced by Fitting and several of its fundamental results were established by Kunen. 10;18
More De nitions
Recall that for a given set Prop of propositional symbols, we de ned Prop # = Prop f p j p 2 Propg. Throughout Section 4 we will use the symbol Form to represent the set of all formulas with given propositional symbols and no connectives other than >; ?;^; _;:; ; . Also the following conventions will be used. When we refer to an arbitrary formula of Form(Prop), we will use symbol B. When we refer to an arbitrary formula of Form(Prop # ), we will use symbol D.
When we refer to arbitrary values in fT; F; U; Cg, we will use symbols x; y. When we refer to an arbitrary value in f0; 1g, we will use symbol d.
When we refer to a two-valued interpretation, we will use symbol v. When we refer to a four-or three-valued interpretation, we will use symbol I. These symbols will be also used with primes or with indices.
De nition 52 (Positive transformation and negative transformation)
We de ne the positive transformation ( ) + 2 This de nition extends positive and negative transformations de ned in Subsection 3.1 to formulas which include also ; . This de nition will be crucial for describing the correspondence between multivalued semantics and the two-valued semantics as well as for analyzing internal symmetries of the constructive completion.
The following remark relates the positive transformation to the constructive transformation of a program.
Remark 53 Earlier in the paper we used the symbol P + to denote the constructive transformation of general program P. We will argue here that this use of the symbol + is consistent (up to the classical or intuitionistic equivalence) with the use of + to represent the positive transformation + 2 The remaining part of this subsection contains de nitions and lemmas concerned with notation which allows us to handle the cases of di erent connectives simultaneously. Additional lemmas concern symmetries in the de nitions of connectives. This material is technical in nature and will have no bearing on the further presentation of the theory, however it will be used in some proofs.
De nition 55 For any operation : fT; F; U; Cg n ! fT; F; U; Cg, we de ne: + : f0; 1g 2n ! f0; 1g as + Lemma 60 For every connective among >; ?;^; _; :; and for any x 1 ; x 0 1 ; :::; x n ; x 0 n 2 f0; 1g, where n 0 is the arity of , the following equality holds: + (:x 0 1 ; :x 1 ; :::; :x 0 n ; :x n ) = : ? (x 1 ; x 0 1 ; :::; x n ; x 0 n ).
Moreover this equality implies the following one:
? (:x 0 1 ; :x 1 ; :::; :x 0 n ; :x n ) = : + (x 1 ; x 0 1 ; :::; x n ; x 0 n ).
This lemma identi es the property essential for Proposition 64. Notice that the lemma does not hold for .
Proof. This subsection is concerned with internal symmetries of the program P + . These symmetries will be used later to prove results which relate multivalued semantics of P and the two-valued semantics of P + .
Let us start by de ning a natural function which transforms a two-valued interpretation of Prop # into a two-valued interpretation of Prop # . 
De nition 62
Point 8 is trivially true. For a proof of point 9 assume that p B is the unique statement in P C which de nes p. By Proposition 64 we have: 2 In the following proposition we will list equivalent characterizations of the notion of corresponding interpretations. The second and the third of these characterizations could be used to de ne a mapping inverse to c. The four-valued x-point semantics for general program P is an extension of the three-valued x-point semantics for P, The four-valued x-point semantics for general program P is equivalent to the two-valued x-point semantics for positive program P + .
Theorem 80 (Comparison of x-point semantics)
Let P be a general program over Prop. Then c is an isomorphism from the structure hf0; 1g Prop # ; S C (Prop # ); ; \; T ; ; S ; T P + i onto the structure hfT; F; U; Cg Prop ; S 3 (Prop); k ; \; T ; ; S ; P i. Proof. To show that c is an isomorphism we need to verify that: The implication 1 ! 2 is obvious because every three-valued interpretation is a four valued interpretation.
To prove 2 ! 1 assume that Comp(P) j = 3 B. Let I be a four-valued model for Comp(P). We need to show that I j = B. Consider the least x-point of P . lfp P is a three-valued interpretation and lfp P j = Comp(P), so lfp P j = B. As I is a model for Comp(P), it is a x-point of P , so lfp P k I. As B contains no connectives other than >; ?;^;_; :, by k-monotonicity of B we obtain I j = B.
For a proof of 1 $ 3 consider the following. Proof.
1. For four-valued interpretations I, I(B 1 B 2 ) = I((B 1 B 2 )^(B 2 B 1 )), so we have Comp(P) j = 4 P, and the implication to the left follows. For a proof of the implication to the right, assume that Comp(P) j = 4 B. Take any I such that I j = 4 P. We will show that I j = 4 B. As I j = 4 P, P (I) k I, so there exists a x-point I 0 of P such that I 0 k I. As I 0 is a x-point of P , I 0 j = 4 Comp(P), so I 0 j = 4 B, and by k-monotonicity of B, I j = 4 B.
2. The proof is analogous to that of point 1. 
Conclusion
We considered propositional logic programs with negations. For a program P we de ned a constructive transformation P + . This transformation is closely related to Mancarella's intensional negation. Using this notion we proved completeness of SLDNF-resolution with respect to deductions in classical, intuitionistic, intermediate and modal logics. The main results of this part of work are contained in Theorems 19, 40, 43 and 45. (The rst two of these results were proved in the author's doctoral dissertation and announced without proofs in a conference paper. 22;23 ) Then, we anlyzed the relation of the constructive transformation and multivalued semantics. In Theorem 80 we proved that the four-valued x-point semantics for P is an extension of the three-valued x-point semantics for P, and is equivalent to the two-valued x-point semantics for P + . In Theorem 87 we proved that the four-valued declarative semantics for P, the three-valued declarative semantics for P, and the two-valued declarative semantics for P + are equivalent. This analysis of declarative semantics is complemented by Theorem 88 whose proof idea is due to St ark, and by Theorem 89.
We feel that it is important to revise the bulk of the theory of logic programming, replacing various complex technical notions by notions which are simpler and have more intuitive meaning. Only after such a revision can the semantics of logic programming become of practical use to programmers, and only then may those writing programs rely more on their declarative meaning than on understanding of the intricacies of the computational mechanism. The results of this paper suggest that:
SLDNF-resolution for a program P should be replaced by SLD-resolution for the constructive transformation P + of this program, and multivalued x-point and declarative semantics for P should be replaced by the conventional two-valued semantics for P + . In this paper we considered only propositional programs, however evidence exists that these two postulates are valid also for rst-order programs, and for such programs they are especially important.
